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IF DOROTHY HAD NOT HAD TOTO TO PULL
BACK THE WIZARD’S CURTAIN: THE
FABRICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A
WORLD RELIGION
Richard Stith*
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the increasing penetration and control
of nations by amorphous ideas of human rights, touching upon the symbiotic
relation between global capital and human rights, the anti-democratic nature of
many rights, the radically political nature of positive rights, the frequent absence
of national self-esteem and the consequent yearning for supranational approval,
the belief that judges and their surrogates are priests speaking for God, the
search for validating judicial will as replacement for a dead God, loss of judicial
confidence in reason, and banal judicial vanity. These lead to the creation of the
last and greatest Leviathan, a mortal god that can never be dethroned.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1939 film, The Wizard of Oz,1 Dorothy and her friends
undertake a pilgrim quest to the Emerald City of Oz, in the fervent belief
that the wizard who rules that city has the preternatural power to save
them from several perceived afflictions. When Dorothy’s dog Toto pulls
back the curtain that veils the wizard, the group discovers not only that
the supposed wizard is in fact a charlatan without any special powers—
but also that they did not need the help of great magic, simply more selfconfidence. If not for Toto, they might well have continued to depend on
fake wizardry. This essay suggests that the worldwide quest for human
rights may likewise be founded in part on a lack of self-esteem coupled
with the credulous veneration of wizards—without a Toto to reveal the
all-too-human character behind the curtain. It is worth examining the
superhuman pretensions of some international human rights advocates
and the strange sort of religion being fabricated to support those
pretensions.
The title of the panel for which this paper was prepared
(“Implementing International Human Rights in the Domestic Context”)
betrays an American parochialism. The experience of much of the rest of
the world belies the notion that such rights need to be “implemented” in
order to become effective domestically. That is, our dualist American
separation of national from international law and our superpower status
*
Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. A.B. (Harvard University); M.A.
(University of California, Berkeley); Ph.D. (Yale University), J.D. (Yale Law School).
1
THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 1939).
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have preserved for us a democratic choice rapidly disappearing around
the world. In Argentina and Mexico, for example, international law is
directly effective and supreme2 over both prior and subsequent national
legislation; in the case of Argentina, a good many human rights treaties
actually become part of the constitution.3 Mexico’s treaty with the

2
Argentina: Decisión de la Corte Suprema del 7 de julio de 1992 en el caso
“Ekmekdjian, Miguel Ángel c/ Sofovich, Gerardo y otros.” Art. 75 inciso 22 (first
paragraph) of the Constitución Nacional reads: “Los tratados y concordatos tienen
jerarquía superior a las leyes.” (“Treaties and concordats rank higher than statutes.”)
Mexico: Tratados internacionales. Se ubican jerárquicamente por encima de las leyes federales y en
un segundoplano respecto de la constitución federal. 9ª. Época; Pleno; S.J.F. y su Gaceta; X,
Noviembre de 1999, página 46, Tesis: P. LXXVII/99 Tesis Aislada. Materia Constitucional,
approved in prívate session 28 October 1999. This thesis was first elaborated in the amparo
en revisión 1475/98, Sindicato Nacional de Controladores de Tránsito Aéreo, 11 de mayo
de 1999.
3
Art. 75 inciso 22 of the Constitución Nacional of Argentina lists various constitutionlevel human rights declarations and treaties:
La Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del
Hombre; la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; el Pacto
Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; el
Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y su Protocolo
Facultativo, la Convención sobre la Prevención y la Sanción del
Delito de Genocidio; la Convención Internacional sobre la
Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación de races; la
Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas
de Discriminación contra la Mujer; la Convención contra la Tortura
y otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes; la
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño; en las condiciones de su
vigencia, tienen jerarquía constitucional, no derogan artículo alguno
de la primera parte de esta Constitución y deben entenderse
complementarios de los derechos y garantías por ella reconocidos.
(In English): The American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the
American Convention on Human Rights; the International Pact on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on Civil
and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Woman; the Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishments; the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; in the full force of their
provisions, they have constitutional hierarchy, do not repeal any
section of the First Part of this Constitution and are to be
understood as complementing the rights and guarantees recognized
herein.
Translated in Georgetown University, Political Database of the Americas, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html (last visited Nov.
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European Union authorizes a wide range of new secondary legislation
by treaty-created bodies without further approval by any domestic
legislature.4 The European Community treaties have all these effects
among their signatory states.5
A Dutch commentator recently summarized a common nonAmerican perspective:
[I]nternational law influences and often determines the
domestic rule of law . . . governing directly the legal
rights and obligations of private persons who are located
in domestic legal orders. International law, particularly
international human rights law, imposes such
15, 2009). Interpretations of these treaties by international tribunals may further affect the
meaning of the Argentine constitution: Corte Suprema, 23/12/2004, Espósito, Miguel A.
4
The treaty states:
El Consejo Conjunto, a efectos de alcanzar los objetivos del
presente Acuerdo, estará facultado para tomar decisiones en los casos
previstos en el Acuerdo. Las decisiones que se adopten tendrán
carácter vinculante para las Partes, que tomarán las medidas necesarias
para ejecutarlas. El Consejo Conjunto podrá también hacer las
recomendaciones pertinentes.
Las decisiones y recomendaciones se adoptarán previo acuerdo
entre las dos Partes.
Acuerdo de Asociación Económica, Concertación Política y Cooperación entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos y la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados Miembros, art. 47, DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA
FEDERACIÓN, 26 de Junio de 2000, Segunda Sección. The Consejo Conjunto may delegate its
functions to the more technical Comité Conjunto, whose decisions become equally binding.
Id. art. 48(2). Note that in the course of regulating trade, the Consejo may make judgments
of “public morality.” Id. art. 5(k). And the Consejo will decide on abuses of economically
dominant positions, including “state monopolies” and “public enterprises.” Id. art. 11(2)(b,
d, e). “Human rights” are from the beginning declared to be an “essential element” of the
treaty, all of which give Consejo (and the Comité) much discretion to develop the treaty.
Id. art. 1. Respect for “democratic principles” is also mentioned (id.), but no mechanism for
referral to Mexican democratic institutions is anywhere to be found. For a more detailed
analysis of the Mexico-European Union Treaty of 2000, see Richard Stith, México:
¿nuevamente una colonia europea?, in 2 JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMANN PAPER SERIES No.
8, 2 (Mariela Arenas ed., 2003), available at http://www6.miami.edu/EUCenter/stith
final.pdf.
5
See Treaty Establishing the European Community for the direct effect of secondary
regulations legislated by the treaty-created institutions and for the extremely wide scope of
such secondary legislation. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 45 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES C325/33 (2002), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf.
Its supremacy
over member state law was originally asserted by the European Court of Justice in the
following two cases: Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastinge, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105 and Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585,
1964 C.M.L.R. 425. For a more detailed examination, see Richard T. Stith, El problema del
alto tribunal no razonable, in DOS VISIONES NORTEAMERICANAS DE LA JURISDICCIÓN DE LA
UNIÓN EUROPEA 29, 29–32 (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela 2000).
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fundamental limitations on the power of government
that in fact it has become hard to think of rule of law
problems in the relationship between a state and its
citizens that do not have some connection to
international law.6
How has this widespread global governance come about? This short
essay contends that one key factor has been the development of human
rights as a kind of world religion. Conversion to this new religion, in
turn, arguably results from a coming together of two factors: on the
international side, what can be called “forces of domination,” and on the
domestic side, what can be called “forces of surrender.”
II. FORCES OF DOMINATION
Most obviously, capitalism prefers property and commerce rights to
be immune to the erratic and redistributive impulses of popular
majorities, for the sake of economic predictability and security. Global
capitalism is thus fundamentally anti-democratic, preferring uniform
rules favoring capital imposed on all nations. For example, it may
demand that international treaties be made constitutionally supreme
over subsequent domestic legislation in order to reassure foreign
investors that they need not fear local legal surprises. The “democratic
deficit” has been labeled perhaps the “most severe” and “most serious”
problem for the transnational legal order.7
Those who perceive workers’ interests and environmental
conservation to be endangered by free trade have long engaged in
protest against this undemocratic globalization. For example, back in
1999, a full-page advertisement in the New York Times denounced the
World Trade Organization (WTO) as “the world’s first global
government. But it was elected by no-one, it operates in secrecy, and its
mandate is this: To undermine the constitutional rights of sovereign
nations.”8
At first sight, it might seem that those who use the language of
human rights would favor protecting national sovereignty and shielding
André Nollkaemper, The Internationalized Rule of Law, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 74,
75 (2009). Professor Kaemper directs the Amsterdam Center for International Law,
University of Amsterdam.
7
Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism:
Its Features, Challenges and Solutions, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 89, 113 (2008).
8
Invisible Government, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at A15. The ad
indicates that the signers (which include, for example, Greenpeace and the United
Steelworkers of America) “are all part of a coalition of more than 60 non-profit
organizations that favor democratic, localized, ecologically sound alternatives. . . .”
6
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citizens from the abuses of global capital through democratic legislation.
This inference would be a mistake. Except for political rights to
democratic participation and rule, all rights are anti-democratic: All are
intended to be (sometimes insuperable) barriers to the will of the
political community as disclosed by majority vote.9 Those interested in
various sorts of human rights are not necessarily opposed to “invisible”
or “secret” government, as long as their kind of rights, not just propertyrelated rights, get a cut of the action. They, in turn, have something to
offer to capital, i.e. legitimation. Only when global governance comes to
mean protection from domestic oppression, as opposed to merely
protection from domestic property redistribution, is it likely to be
accepted.10 (Franciscan friars did indeed humanize and soften the
Spanish conquest of Mexico, and their motives may have been wholly
benevolent. Yet at the same time they legitimated and facilitated that
conquest.11)
Already in 1998, former human rights activist Kenneth Anderson12
put the matter in suitably religious terms:
9
The anti-democratic character of rights is obscured when the word “democratic” is
used for private freedoms that are unrelated either to a demos or to a kratos, as for example
in the phrase “It is undemocratic for the state to tell citizens where they must worship.” By
contrast, “democratic” in the sense used in this paper refers always to majority-decision
origin, not to private-rights content.
10
Thomas M. Franck, Preface: International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize?, in RULING
THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE xiv
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD?] (quoting
David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?) 37, 40
(describing and proposing world constitutionalism as a basis for international law). The
constitutional place of human rights in this scheme is spelled out in greatest detail by
Mattias Kumm. See Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the
Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD? 258,
303–10. Stephen Gardbaum’s essay highlights the importance of human rights as a means
of overcoming the delegitimation consequent upon supranational law’s endemic
democracy deficit. See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International
Constitutionalism, in RULING THE WORLD? 233. He notes that “No one talks of a democracy
deficit in the European Convention on Human Rights[,]” and
[t]he story of the transformation of the European Union from a treatybased to a supranational entity is now, of course, too familiar to
require details . . . [Member states’] sovereignty was limited and
partially transferred to a vertical, supranational system of
international law. In this transformation, human rights famously
played no intrinsic role but rather only an instrumental or pragmatic
one as the sugar helping certain member state courts to swallow the
pill.
Id. at 235, 246.
11
T.R. FEHRENBACH, FIRE AND BLOOD 204–08 (DaCapo Press 1995).
12
Professor Anderson recounts some of his activist experience in The Ottawa Convention
Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of
International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91, 91–120 (2000).
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Painting such groups as human rights organizations and
the like as fundamentally in tension with transnational
capital is simply an illusion.
If the global
nongovernmental movement, as a key agent of
internationalism, sees itself as a kind of “Sunday School
of the nations,” schooling them in their moral duties, it is
able to do so . . . [while global capital] serves as the
battering ram to make societies accessible and malleable
to internationalism itself.13
Let us look at a relatively non-controversial example of nondemocratic human rights hubris, the fabrication of the right to water.
Since no one is against drinking, we can avoid disputes concerning the
right’s core content and focus instead on its pedigree and on the
coherence of the many peripheral rights derived from it.14
The “right to water” is nowhere explicitly mentioned as a right per se
in any global treaty.15 Yet the United Nations’ Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has indicated in eighteen-page detail what the
“right to water” requires and how it will be enforced.16
Note first that this Committee, like other U.N. treaty-monitoring
bodies, need be made up neither of jurists, nor of economists, nor of
engineers or other technical experts. The only requirement is that its
members “shall be experts with recognized competence in the field of
human rights.”17 It does not operate as a court, with rules guaranteeing
fair submission of evidence and argument on both sides. Nevertheless,
the Committee felt jurisdictionally competent to issue General Comment
No. 15,18 indicating in legal language precisely how the International
13
Kenneth Anderson, Secular Eschatologies and Class Interests of the Internationalized New
Class, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS 109, 113 (Carrie Gustafson &
Peter Juviler eds., 1999).
14
Of course, in an inspirational sense, all post-war human rights claims can be said to
originate in the recognition of the “inherent dignity” of all human beings.
See The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., Dec. 10, 1948 (“Whereas recognition of the
inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world[]”); Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany art. 1,
para. 1, May 23, 1949 (“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar.”).
15
This is not to say that no treaty ever refers to individual entitlements to water in
certain contexts.
16
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/
AH355.pdf.
17
U.N. Economic and Social Council Res. 1985/17 (May 28, 1985).
18
United Nations, Substantive Issues, supra note 16.
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Covenant on Economic and Social Rights19 requires the right to water to
be implemented world-wide.
Paragraph 3 of the General Comment begins with a claim of treaty
textual support:
Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies . . . the
right to an adequate standard of living “including
adequate food, clothing and housing”. The use of the
word “including” indicates that this catalogue of rights
was not intended to be exhaustive. The right to water
clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential
for securing an adequate standard of living . . . . The
right to water is also inextricably related to . . . the rights
to adequate housing and adequate food . . . .20
Paragraph 6 elaborates: “water is necessary to produce food.”21 Yet
it goes on simply to announce: “Nevertheless, priority in the allocation
of water must be given to the right to water for personal and domestic
uses.”22 Without missing a beat, it somehow manages to make many
other things also prior: “Priority should also be given to the water
resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as water
required to meet the core obligations of each of the Covenant rights.”23
Paragraph 11 warns us further not to imagine some easy, mechanical
way to comply with this right: “The adequacy of water should not be
interpreted narrowly, by mere reference to volumetric quantities and
technologies. Water should be treated as a social and cultural good, and
not primarily as an economic good.”24
Paragraph 14 warns that “investments should not disproportionately
favour expensive water supply services and facilities that are often
accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of the population, rather
than investing in services and facilities that benefit a far larger part of the
population.”25 Yet Paragraph 16(h) indicates somewhat to the contrary
that “persons . . . living in arid and semi-arid areas, or on small islands
are [to be] provided with safe and sufficient water.”26 If the few persons

19
See generally GAOR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.
20
UNITED NATIONS, Substantive Issues, supra note 16, ¶ 3.
21
Id. ¶ 6.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. ¶ 11.
25
Id. ¶ 14.
26
Id. ¶ 16(h).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 4

854

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

living in such regions have to move to cheaper water supplies, their
human rights apparently will have been violated.
Paragraph 34 declares water-related duties to extend beyond
national borders, “Depending on the availability of resources, States
should facilitate realization of the right to water in other countries, for
example through provision of water resources . . . [,]”27 adding in
Paragraph 38, “[f]or the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes
to emphasize that it is particularly incumbent on States parties . . . to
provide international assistance . . . .”28 The rights to water declared by
the Committee must be taken into account whenever a state enters an
international agreement.29
Enforcement mechanisms take up many pages of the Committee’s
General Comment 15, but only a few quotations are needed to see the
degree of supranational tutelage required: Paragraph 47 indicates that
“States parties [have] an obligation to adopt a national strategy or plan of
action to realize the right to water[,]” and that in so doing “States parties
should avail themselves of technical assistance and cooperation of the
United Nations specialized agencies . . . .”30 Paragraph 54 adds “During
the periodic reporting procedure, the Committee will engage in a process
of . . . joint consideration by the State party and the Committee of the
indicators and national benchmarks which will then provide the targets
to be achieved during the next reporting period [five years later].”31
Although the realization of many of the declared rights to water
rights is thus progressive, i.e. there is no duty to fully comply at once,
“States parties must establish that they have taken the necessary and
feasible steps[,]” acting “in good faith to take such steps.”32 Failure to do
so “amounts to a violation of the right.”33 Much is expected: “A State
which is unwilling to use the maximum of its available resources for the
realization of the right to water is in violation of its obligations under the
Covenant.”34 As an example of treaty violation, Paragraph 44(c)(ii)
mentions “insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources
which results in the non-enjoyment of the right to water by individuals
or groups . . . .”35

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
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What can be said of the Committee’s work? There is no doubt that
the world faces a crisis regarding the need for water.36 The question is
whether cock-sure activist intervention and a quasi-judicial enforcement
style, the creation and imposition on states of duties to provide water
that are contradictory, impossible to fulfill completely, and only
tendentiously treaty-based, is the best way to proceed, as opposed to
letting real jurists and technical experts hammer out workable
international treaties and national legislation.37 In the absence of any
binding enforcement power by this and other U.N. treaty-monitoring
bodies—or even a fair and official dispute resolution mechanism
entrusted to the bodies—there would no doubt be much national
resistance to the pretentions of the political activists on such committees
were it not for the “forces of surrender” to be examined below.
However, before turning to those receptive forces, one should look
more deeply at an inherent tension between any massive number of
rights and democracy, quite apart from the additional problems of
pedigree and competence presented by the new rights fabricated by
monitoring bodies of lay human rights activists.38
When rights are few and negative (requiring only that the state leave
individuals alone in certain spheres), a large field is left open to
democratic choice. That is, even when rights are meant completely to
trump majority goals, where rights ask for little there may well be a way
to achieve those goals without abrogating the rights in question. This is
no longer so where rights expand to cover most human goods. If the

Joseph W. Dellapenna’s recent article is an excellent summary of the crisis and of the
range of legal solutions available. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Water
Law in a Climate of Disruption, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 43 (2008). For a close study of the
complexity of one part of the relevant law, see OWEN MCINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ashgate
2007).
37
For a critique of the rights approach to water from a proponent of global capitalism,
favoring leaving water largely in the hands of the market, see Kendra Okonski, Is Water a
Human Right?, 24 THE NEW ATLANTIS 61, 61–73 (Spring 2009), available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090617_TNA24Okonski.pdf. See also Owen
McIntyre, Water Services Privatization and Recognition of the Human Right to Water in
International Investment Law—Finding Fertile Ground in Unlikely Places, Presentation on
Global Justice and Sustainable Development organized by the International Law
Association: Committee on International Law and Sustainable Development (Aug. 26–27,
2009) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) (Prof. McIntyre argues that,
contrary to the assumptions of many, the human right to water is compatible with
privatization, albeit with some complexities).
38
For quite different critiques of rights-based regimes, focusing on their excessive
individualism, see Richard Stith, The Priority of Respect, 44 INT’L PHIL. Q. 165 (2004); Richard
Stith, Generosity: A Duty Without a Right, 25 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 203 (1991).
36
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private achievement of almost any good overrides majority preferences,
little room for democratic choice remains.
Furthermore, as they multiply, rights cannot maintain their nearabsolute character, for they inevitably clash one with another. Some sort
of hierarchy, or at least a balancing technique, has to be applied to
determine which rights must give way.
It might seem that democratic voting would reenter here, to
determine the balance or hierarchy of rights. However, this is not so,
except where the rights flow only from some positive law source within
a legislature’s competence (e.g., a constitution able to be legislatively
amended). For rights in the full sense are legal entitlements, not just
competing social interests or desires. So only judicial or quasi-judicial
authorities (using reasoned elaboration of general norms to decide
cases), and not legislatures (representing the will of the people in
formulating general norms), are competent to decide the concrete weight
to be given to each right.
Yet at the same time, rights to various human goods, like the goods
at which they aim, are often incommensurable, or nearly so, especially
with the postmodern loss of Enlightenment confidence in reason. In our
multicultural world, it is difficult or impossible to determine by reasoned
deliberation an order of priority among clashing rights to form a family,
to education, to work, to health, to worship God, and all the rest. Acts of
will, of free choice, are needed to decide such conflicts. Only
legislatures, not courts, are authorized so to act.
Thus choice among rights can be done neither by legislatures
(because legitimation by reason is needed) nor by courts (because
legitimation by will is needed).
Furthermore, many of the commonly proclaimed international
rights, such as the right to water, are positive rather than negative.
Everyone’s negative right to water would require only that the state not
act to cut off anyone’s hydration. Everyone’s positive right to water, as
examined above, would require that the state act to supply all with
hydration. These positive rights are even less rationally adjudicable than
negative rights. After all, a state could uphold an infinite number of
potentially conflicting rights if the rights in question were completely
negative—via the simple recourse of doing absolutely nothing. But with
positive rights, there is no escape from choices among incommensurable
alternatives. Suppose resources are limited and either the right to health
can be honored with a new hospital or the right to education can be
honored with a new university, but not both. Which right is to be
deemed superior?
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Moreover, positive rights are typically not just rights to have the
state act but rights to have the state act effectively, i.e. rights to a result,
such as the provision of water. But the future is always uncertain.
Rainfall and climate may vary. Rules for action or inaction, the stuff of
ordinary litigation, can in principle be clear and even absolute, but the
means needed to effect results are always tentative and contingent.
Judicial reason is not enough to decide between alternatives here. An
educated guess followed by an authoritative act of will, i.e. a legislative
choice, is needed to choose a plan for the future. But if judicial reasoning
cannot reach such a conclusion and no binding international legislature
has been created to do so, no such mandate can be legitimate.
Without the ability to achieve legitimacy, either through careful
judicial elaboration of already binding norms or through the will of the
peoples of the world, how can a new list of positive international human
rights requirements, like those proclaimed under “the right to water,” be
made effective?
Only one answer is possible:
by dogmatic
proclamation, Roma locuta est (“Rome has spoken”), backed up with guilt
and shame for those who refuse to comply. Cut off from any other
foundation, the option of a new religious authority is the only one left for
human rights activists.
This missionary spirit is not hidden. The website for UNESCO
begins with these words under “About UNESCO”:
UNESCO—the
United
Nations
Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was
founded on 16 November 1945. For this specialized
United Nations agency, it is not enough to build
classrooms in devastated countries or to publish
scientific breakthroughs. Education, Social and Natural
Science, Culture and Communication are the means to a
far more ambitious goal: to build peace in the minds of
men.
Today, UNESCO functions as a laboratory of ideas
and a standard-setter to forge universal agreements on
emerging ethical issues.39
To the end of forging such agreements, where none now exist, novice
missionaries must be catechized and sent forth. Thus the June 2009
UNESCO “International Guidelines on Sexuality Education” indicate
39
UNESCO, What is it it? What Does it do?, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=3328&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2009).
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that children as young as fifteen are to be taught “Advocacy to promote
the right to and access to safe abortion.”40
Yet the U.N.’s is a strange religion, one with many dogmas but
without a theology—i.e., without a systematic understanding that ranks
all rights and relates them to the premise of inherent human dignity.41
The result is what Kenneth Anderson has called “serial absolutism”42:
activist proclamation of each right as an absolute demand, before going
on to another, potentially conflicting, absolute, as we saw in the various
contradictory rights to water.
This repeatedly-cascading disintegration (in the set of human rights)
conflicts, moreover, with the rule of law itself. If “priority in the
allocation of water must be given to the right to water for personal and
domestic uses” and “must also be given to the water resources required
to prevent starvation and disease,” a nation can always be held in
violation and subject to censure (or “name and shame” as the activists
like to call it).43 Conflicting, incommensurable, mutable duties do not
provide the notice essential to the rule of law.44 Why would nations
genuflect before them?
UNESCO, International Guidelines on Sexuality Education: An Evidence Informed
Approach to Effective Sex, Relationships and HIV/STI Education 42 (2009), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001832/183281e.pdf.
Despite its “evidence
informed” subtitle, no evidence for or against abortion or abortion rights is included in the
proposed sexuality curriculum guide; the right to abortion is simply proclaimed.
Conservative opposition to the guidelines (calling them, e.g., a “one-size-fits-all approach
that’s damaging to cultures, religions and to children[]”) may result in their revision.
Steven Erlanger, U.N. Guide for Sex Ed Generates Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A6.
41
Even as human rights gain ever-increasing global force, the ideological core of human
rights, the idea of inherent human dignity [see supra note 14] may itself be in the process of
disintegration. On the one hand, efforts are being made to recognize the dignity of animals
and even of plants. The Swiss Constitution speaks in Article 120(2) of the “dignity of the
creature” including the plant.
See BUNDESVERFASSUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [Constitution] art. 120(2) (Switz.) (“Der Bund erlässt Vorschriften
über den Umgang mit Keim- und Erbgut von Tieren, Pflanzen und anderen Organismen.
Er trägt dabei der Würde der Kreatur . . . .”). On the other hand, the idea of “dignity” is
itself under attack. Human autonomy rather than human dignity is to be respected. See
generally Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, available
at http://www.tnr.com/article/the-stupidity-dignity, reviewed by Open to Interpretation,
NATURE, June 12, 2008, at 824, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v453/
n7197/pdf/453824b.pdf. But few if any animals or plants are capable of autonomy in the
sense of human free choice. Will non-autonomous non-humans have rights while only
autonomous humans have rights? Belief in such a religion will be a challenge.
42
John Fonte, Democracy’s Trojan Horse, 76 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 117, 125 (2004),
available at http://hudson.org/files/publications/fonte_national_interest_summer_04.pdf.
43
United Nations, Substantive Issues, supra note 16.
44
Kristina Morvai of Hungary, then a member of the treaty-monitoring body for the
Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women, has made this very
point, stating that “one of the basic principles of the Rule of Law is that interpretations of
40
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III. FORCES OF SURRENDER
It is easy to see why global capital would need a human rights
crusade to cover up its seizure of world power and not hard to discern
how nations could be pressured financially to go along. After all, to be
excluded from the WTO or the World Bank as a human rights pariah
would be to incur significant material deprivations. But many nations
do more than just go along with international human rights; they
welcome them. Why would they happily surrender their sovereignty
and the rule of law to dogmatic activists who possess no coherent
program with which all nations agree?
For many nations with a Judeo-Christian heritage, one answer may
be that they have long been waiting for a world-wide messianic era.
After all, it is only in the context of the submission of all nations to
Jerusalem that Isaiah could prophesy “they shall beat their swords into
ploughshares.”45 Pope Benedict XVI’s recent encyclical Caritas in Veritate
states “there is urgent need of a true world political authority . . . vested with
the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and
respect for rights.”46 Like the Aztecs who mistook the Spanish
conquistador for the returning god Quetzalcoatl, Roman Catholic nations,
of Latin America in particular, may see the agents of human rights as
God’s messengers.47 More generally, devout and conservative nations
throughout the world may imagine a divine inspiration behind the
oracular pontifications of the U.N. and its treaty monitoring bodies.

the law must be coherent and consistent, and decisions based on the law must be
predictable and foreseeable,” concluding that as long as treaty bodies engage in “creative
interpretation” they are “largely incompatible” with the rule of law and thus cannot be
accepted as legally binding. Kristina Morvai, Respecting National Sovereignty and
Restoring International Law: The Need to Reform UN Treaty Monitoring Committees,
Briefing at UN Headquarters, New York (Sept. 6, 2006), quoted in DOUGLAS SYLVA & SUSAN
YOSHIHARA, RIGHTS BY STEALTH: THE ROLE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES IN THE
CAMPAIGN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 35 (The International Organizations
Research Group 2006), available at http://www.c-fam.org/docLib/20080425_Number_8_
Rights_By _Stealth.pdf. For further, probing analysis of the dilemmas of positive rights,
see Susan Yoshihara, The Quest for Happiness: How the UN's Advocacy of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights Undermines Liberty and Opportunity, in CONUNDRUM: THE LIMITS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (Brett D. Schaefer ed., 2009).
45
Isaiah 2:4.
46
POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE ¶ 67 (2009), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben_xvi_en
c_20090629_caritas_in_veritate_en.html.
47
Mary Ann Glendon argues that Catholic traditions have made Latin American nations
leading advocates of positive social and economic rights. See generally Mary Ann Glendon,
The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Rights Idea, 16 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 27 (2003).
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Not the presence but the loss of faith may also be operative. It was
lack of confidence in themselves that led the lion, the scarecrow, and the
tin woodman to turn to the wizard of Oz to save them. Kenneth
Anderson suggests that a worldwide deconstructive attack may be
operative: “The global market penetrates what remains of traditional
societies with its irresistible consumer goods and saturates all places
with the media message, its own form of the good news, that the world
is one and cultural differences are nothing more than differences in
consumer preferences.”48 Human rights then step in to fill the ensuing
moral and spiritual void. Human rights provide a gratefully received
“foundationalism[,]”49 once the old religions have been destroyed by
consumerism. Those who judge such rights are the “new priests of civil
society,” according to Quebec Chief Justice Michel Robert.50
Those nations, such as Argentina, that have committed obvious past
atrocities no doubt feel a special need to be utterly deferential and
contrite before the “new priests.” But humility is guaranteed for many
other countries by the impossibility of compliance with all the
requirements of contradictory human rights. Like Luther’s use of the
law to “increase transgressions[,]”51 human rights demands may be so
difficult and unending that they function to cow nations into submission.
Already ashamed at being poor and backward, a state may sense that it
may never have the means fully to supply all positive rights, or even just
the right to water. Such a government may seek to prove its sincere
intentions by abject apologies and repeated confessions of absolute faith
in human rights, and wholesale surrender to the demands of the
authorities claiming to articulate those rights.
Yet the plight to which the new religion of human rights responds
should not be seen as one which afflicts only societies that still seek a
god. Human rights also meet a special postmodern need.

See Anderson, supra note 13, at 112.
Yeh & Chang, supra note 7, at 108.
50
Cristin Schmitz, Quebec’s Chief Justice Sees a Need to Change Traditional Legal Training, 24
LAW. WEEKLY, No. 1 (May 7, 2004).
51
MARTIN LUTHER, A COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL’S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS 298 (James
Clarke & Co. Ltd. 1953). In his On Christian Liberty, Luther explains that commandments
which are impossible to fulfill have the function of teaching man to “despair of his own
ability . . . . For example, the commandment ‘You shall not covet’ [Exod. 20:17], is a
command which proves us all to be sinners, for no one can avoid coveting no matter how
much he may struggle against it.” MARTIN LUTHER, ON CHRISTIAN LIBERTY 11–12 (W. A.
Lambert trans., Fortress Press 2003). “Therefore, . . . a man is compelled to despair of
himself, to seek the help which he does not find in himself elsewhere . . . .” Id. at 12.
Luther, of course, had man seek that help in God rather than in a United Nations. Id.
48
49
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The postmodern world of many or most Western societies, the world
where God and even reason are dead, has been well described by J.H.H.
Weiler:
[T]here is no doubt that the notion that all observations
are relative to the perception of the observer, that what
we have are just competing narratives, has moved from
being a philosophic position to a social reality. It is part
of political discourse: multiculturalism is premised on it
as are the breakdown of authority (political, scientific,
social) and the ascendant culture of extreme
individualism and subjectivity. Indeed, objectivity itself
is considered a constraint on freedom—a strange
freedom, to be sure, empty of content.52
In such a world, no legal “theology” could survive. No rational system
of thought could withstand postmodern skepticism. Every foundation
would turn to sand. And yet the human need for validation does not
disappear. As John Rawls has written, “unless our endeavors are
appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us to maintain the
conviction that they are worthwhile[.]”53 The amorphous “serial
absolutism” of the human rights world is the answer to this conundrum:
It is precisely those accustomed to doubt all truths who are the least selfsufficient in securing their own self-respect, who must conform to, or
generate, some political correctness in order to validate their desire to be
considered persons of moral decency. In the absence of any faith in God
or reason, political approval stands as psychological surrogate for truth.
Certitude can be achieved only by the elimination of all open opposition.
Thus the passionate need for final moral victory before the highest legal
authorities of the world.
Even those occupying the seats of those authorities, even justices on
the highest courts of the world, must feel this need. Absent faith in the
correctness of their own decisions, they must rely on some outside
assurance of the worthiness of their opinions. I recall hearing United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist admit to being at
a loss for words at a cocktail party with Canadian justices. “We cite you.
Why don’t you cite us?” they asked him. He said he felt embarrassed
J.H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in J.H.H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR” AND OTHER ESSAYS
ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 324, 331 (1999).
53
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 441 (Belknap Press 1971). For an extensive
examination of the logic of validation, see Richard Stith, Punishment, Invalidation, and
Nonvalidation, 14 LEGAL THEORY 219 (2008).
52
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and decided to make more effort to cite them in the future.54 In other
words, Canadian jurisprudence would begin to have some weight in
United States Supreme Court decisions so that Chief Justice Rehnquist
could earn the approval of his peers in Canada. Human rights
enforcement offers itself as an obvious transnational task in which high
courts throughout the world can collaborate and compete for acceptance
and prestige.
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s seminal work generalizes this observation;
she shows that judges (like many other professionals) seek validation for
their acts from their increasingly transnational peers.55 Courts and
quasi-courts will decide cases according to what they predict their peers
(or their most prestigious peers) will decide, and world jurisprudence
will approach unanimity.56
No one will be able to argue with these tribunals, for they will not
claim a basis in text or reason. They will just be RIGHT and that is it. If
one were trapped under a national dictator by this rejection of reason,
even if there were no possible physical escape, the mere fact that there
was an outside—some other authority somewhere—might give one the
strength to maintain a critical spirit. But the unfolding international
human rights religion will be universally established. An “immense
tutelary power”57 will have been created with nothing at all beyond its
jurisdiction.

William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Oral
Presentation at Georgetown University Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law:
Defining the Field (Sept. 1999).
55
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004).
56
I have suggested that, in order to have some hope of avoiding this fate, legal
interpretation (in this case of human rights) must be shared with non-judicial institutions
which rely on religious or other independent cultural interpretive traditions and are thus
relatively immune to the need for approval by judicial peers. Richard Stith, Securing the
Rule of Law Through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument from Comparative Law, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 401, 434 n.105 (2008).
57
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 663 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000).
54
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